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We consider a reduced form model with acquisitions and entry. There are two investors and several
small non-investing firms. One investor can acquire a small firm, the other investor decides about
market entry. After that all firms play an oligopoly game. We derive conditions under which increasing
market concentration arises with myopic firms. We apply the framework to a Cournot model with cost
synergies and a Bertrand model where acquisitions extend the product spectrum of a firm.
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1 Introduction
Mega-mergers are one of the favorite topics of the business press. Acquisi-
tions of small firms by dominant competitors generate much less attention.
Nevertheless, they are equally important in many industries. Such acquisi-
tions can lead to strong increases in concentration unless countervailing forces
arise, such as entry by small firms.
This paper therefore considers a setting in which large firms can acquire
small firms and small firms can enter. We analyze under which circumstances
acquisitions as a force towards concentration dominate over entry as a coun-
tervailing force.1 For instance, Sutton (1991) discussed such behavior in the
British beer industry where concentration increased throughout most of the
last century. Large brewers acquired small ones to gain access to their re-
tail outlets, specifically, pubs. At the same time, there was very little entry.
Similar tendencies have been reported for other industries.
To understand the forces behind such outcomes, we consider a two-stage
game. An investment stage is followed by (reduced form) product market
competition. All but two firms play a passive role in the investment stage;
by assumption, they cannot invest. These firms are called small incumbents.
Of the remaining two firms, one is a potential entrant whose investment is
market entry. A firm that enters will not diﬀer from a small incumbent
thereafter. The other remaining firm is called a large incumbent. It is best to
think of the large firm as being the result of sequential acquisitions of small
(unit size) firms in the past — its size then describes how many constituent
small firms it consists of. By assumption, only the large firm is allowed to
acquire others. Acquiring competitors has two potential benefits in the prod-
uct market stage. First, the reduction in the number of competitors increases
equilibrium profits.2 Second, the greater size of the acquiring firm is benefi-
cial in itself:3 This might reflect cost-reducing synergies or additional profits
1We fully acknowledge that by restricting ourselves to acquisitions and entry we ignore
internal investment and exit as important forces of structural change.
2See Perry and Porter (1985)
3These two assumptions do not necessarily imply that the profits after the acquisition
are higher than the joint profits of acquiror and acquiree. Salant et al. (1983) show that
joint profits usually fall in the linear Cournot model, whereas Barros (1998) points out
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from the sale of product varieties that the competitor used to sell. However,
acquisitions also have costs. These acquisition costs are closely related to
small firm profits; they are most reasonably interpreted as a compensation
to the owners of the acquired firm for not earning product market profits.
We identify the circumstances under which a strong concentration equi-
librium arises, where acquisitions take place, but there is no entry. Such
equilibria become more likely (i) the lower the small firm profits, (ii) the
greater the profit increase from a size increase for the large firm and (iii) the
greater the beneficial eﬀect from eliminating competitors..
We then proceed to derive conditions under which concentration is self-
reinforcing, meaning that an acquisition makes future acquisitions more at-
tractive. The most important force towards self-reinforcing concentration is
the existence of demand-markup complementarities. In many cases, acquisi-
tions have a positive eﬀect on the equilibrium demand and on the mark-up of
the acquiror. These eﬀects tend to be self-reinforcing because a high mark-up
is more valuable when demand is high. Thus firms who have increased their
demand (and mark-up) by eliminating one competitor have greater incentives
to increase the mark-up (and demand) by acquiring another competitor. An-
other potential force towards self-reinforcing concentration could come from
negative acquisition externalities. If the acquisition has a negative eﬀect on
the profits of small outside firms, for instance, because of strong synergies,
this will foster self-reinforcing concentration for two reasons. First, as small
firm profits fall, entry obviously becomes less attractive. Second, acquisition
costs should fall, making acquisitions more attractive.
However, there are several reasonable cases where acquisition external-
ities are positive rather than negative as small firms that are not acquired
benefit from decreasing competition. These benefits often outweigh the losses
from facing a "stronger" large firm. Thus, positive acquisition externalities
are a likely reason why concentration is not always self-reinforcing.4 Another
limitation to self-reinforcing concentration might come from decreasing syn-
ergies as the positive eﬀect of an acquisition on the acquiring firm itself (for
they increase if firms are very heterogeneous.
4Salant et. al. (1983) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that such positive external-
ities typically arise in merger models without synergies.
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instance, due to cost reduction) may be falling in the number of acquisitions
already made.
We apply our model to two familiar examples: a linear Cournot model
where acquisitions involve synergies from cost reductions and a model of
diﬀerentiated price competition (similar to Davidson and Deneckere 1985)
where an acquisition expands the product spectrum of the large firm. These
models reveal interesting diﬀerences. In the synergy model, initial conditions
(number of small firms, size of large firm) strongly influence the long-term
behavior of the system so that monopolization only arises if the initial number
of firms is already suﬃciently small and/or the large firm is suﬃciently large.
In the variety model, concentration increases for arbitrary initial values.
We do not make any claim that increasing concentration is the most
likely outcome. The conditions for a strong concentration equilibrium are
fairly strong, and they are not likely to be met in general. However, our
analysis is helpful to provide a clear intuition as to the circumstances under
which increasing concentration is likely or not, which is the main goal of the
paper.
Existing literature has considered endogenous changes in market domi-
nance for given firm numbers, describing circumstances under which firms
that are ahead of others in terms of some state variable can increase their
lead over time.5 This literature suﬀers from the obvious drawback that it
does not deal with mergers or entry. Nevertheless, the conditions for in-
creasing dominance in such models resemble our conditions for increasing
concentration. Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Gowrisankaran (1999) consider
market dynamics with endogenous firm numbers. These papers have a more
general set-up than ours, but they do not deal with our central question.6
Pesendorfer (forthcoming) also focuses on mergers and entry. However, his
objective is to demonstrate that in situations where mergers reduce short-
term profits of the participants, strategic long-term considerations can make
5Variants of these approaches include incremental investment games (Flaherty 1980),
learning-by-doing models (Cabral and Riordan 1994) or switching cost models (Beggs and
Klemperer 1992); Athey and Schmutzler (2001) provide an integrated approach.
6Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004) analyze long-term dynamics in an asymmetric set-
ting with large firms and small firms, but they do not consider entry.
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them profitable. Issues of firm heterogeneity and entry incentives that are
central to our paper are not addressed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. In
section 3, we characterize static equilibria. Section 4 contains a discussion
of self-reinforcing concentration. Section 5 discusses examples. In Section 6,
we provide an overview of the forces towards and against increasing concen-
tration identified in our paper, and we discuss possible extensions.
2 The Model
We consider a two stage game, with an investment stage followed by product
market competition. The players are a large incumbent, small incumbents
and a potential entrant. The total number of firms is I. Each firm i’s size
at the beginning of the game is summarized by a state variable Y 0i ∈ N.
For incumbents, Y 0i > 0. If Y 0i = 1, an incumbent is called small, otherwise
large. For the entrant, Y 0i = 0. Y0 = (Y 01 , ..., Y 0I ) is the initial state vector.
In the first stage, the large firm (firm 1) can invest (i.e., acquire a small
firm). By assumption, an acquisition increases the state of the acquiring
firm by 1 and reduces the state of the acquiree to 0. Also, by assumption the
small incumbent cannot invest. For the entrant (firm 2), investment means
entering the market. For simplicity, we assume that an entrant can only
enter as a small firm. Thus, given the initial states Y 0i , firms simultaneously
choose investment levels ai ∈ {0, 1}, and the new state of the investing firms
is Y 1i = Y 0i + ai.
Product market competition is summarized in the following assumptions:7
(A1) For every vector Y1 = (Y 11 , ..., Y 1I ), there exists a unique profile of
equilibrium payoﬀs Πi (Y1) for i = 1, ..., I.
(A2) Profits are exchangeable: that is, first, for any firm i a permutation
of the vector Y1−i does not change the profits of firm i,8 and second,
7Of the following assumptions, we will only need (A1), (A2) and (A4) to derive our
results. We appeal to (A3) and (A5) only for interpretations.
8As usual, Y−i stands for the vector of states of all firms except firm i.
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if i 6= j such that Y 1i = Y 1j and Y1−i is identical with Y1−j up to a
permutation, then Πi (Y1) = Πj (Y1).
(A3) ∂Π
i
∂Y 1j
< 0 for j 6= i:9 that is, other things being equal, profits are lower
the higher the state of the competitor.
(A4) Πi (Y1) = 0 if Y 1i = 0.
By (A2), the product market profit of each firm is fully determined by the
state of the large firm and the total number F 1 = F 0+a2−a1 of small firms
in the industry. Thus, we denote small firms’ profits as ΠS (Y 11 , F 1) and the
large firms’ profits as ΠL (Y 11 , F 1), respectively.10 Entry costs are exogenous,
given as E > 0. Acquisition costs, however, depend on the outside options of
small firms. Their owners will only agree to a takeover if the profits they could
earn with a small firm are not higher than what they get as a compensation
for the takeover. By (A3), small firm profits are decreasing in the size of
the large firm and the number of small competitors.11 This assumption is
reasonable in many contexts, but in the example section, we shall also discuss
its limitations. As long as (A3) holds, the following assumption is natural:
(A5) Acquisition costs are a function AC(Y 11 , F 1) that is decreasing in both
variables.
3 Equilibrium Conditions
The payoﬀs of the one-period game are presented in Table 1.
< Table 1 about here >
9In the following, we argue as if the profit functions were also defined for non-integers
so that derivatives make sense. At the cost of a more complicated notation, we could
dispense with this assumption.
10For instance, suppose, Y 11 = M ≥ 2, Y 12 = Y 13 = Y 14 = 1. Then profits for firm 1 are
ΠL (M, 3) = Π1 (M, 1, 1, 1) and ΠS (M, 3) = Πi (M, 1, 1, 1) for firms i = 2, 3, 4.
11Note, however, that ∂Πs/∂Y1 < 0 from assumption (A3) does not exclude the pos-
sibility of positive acquisition externalities on small firms’ profits. Positive externalities
might still arise even though there is a negative impact of a larger competitor on the small
firm profit because an acquisition simultanously reduces the number of firms competing
in the market, increasing profits of the remaining firms.
6
It is straightforward to show that all conceivable constellations of pure
strategy equilibria arise for suitable parameters.12 We give explicit conditions
for the strong concentration equilibrium (a1, a2) = (1, 0) .
To this end, we introduce the following notation. Let
NEG (Y1, F ) ≡ ΠS (Y1, F )−E
denote the net entry gain, the increase in payoﬀ resulting from entry into a
market with a large firm with state Y1 and F other small firms. Let
NAG (Y1, F ) ≡ ΠL (Y1 + 1, F − 1)−ΠL (Y1, F )−AC (Y1 + 1, F − 1)
be the net acquisition gain, the payoﬀ increase from an acquisition for a firm
of size Y1 when there are F small firms in the market without the acquisition.
Proposition 1 The strong concentration equilibrium (1, 0) arises as a
unique pure strategy equilibrium if the following conditions hold simultane-
ously:
(i) NEG (Y 01 + 1, F 0)< 0 (ENT1)
(ii) NAG (Y 01 , F 0) > 0 (ACQ0)
(iii) NEG(Y 01 , F 0 + 1)< 0 or (ENT0)
NAG (Y 01 , F 0 + 1) > 0 (ACQ1)
The proof involves straightforward checks of best response conditions.13
For instance, (ENT1) is the no-entry condition and (ACQ0) is the acquisi-
tion condition.14 Together they guarantee existence. (iii) gives uniqueness.
To interpret the proposition, introduce the following notation
OSE = ΠL (Y1 + 1, F − 1)−ΠL (Y1, F − 1)
MSE = ΠL (Y1, F − 1)−ΠL (Y1, F ) .
12Specifically, we can have each of the four conceivable unique equilibria, multiple equi-
libria [(0, 0) / (1, 1) or (0, 1) / (1, 0)] or no pure strategy equilibria.
13For existence, it suﬃces that conditions (ENT1) and (ACQ0) hold with weak
inequality.
14The numerical symbol in the conditions denotes the opponent player’s action. For
instance, (ENT1) says that entry is not profitable for the entrant, given that the large
firm plays a1 = 1.
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OSE is the own state eﬀect, describing how the higher own state after an
acquisition translates into (usually) higher profits. MSE is themarket struc-
ture eﬀect, which isolates the profit increase resulting from the elimination
of one competitor. Then, we have
NAG (Y1, F ) = OSE +MSE −AC (Y1 + 1, F − 1) .
Thus, if profit reacts strongly to an increase in the own state, (ACQ0) and
(ACQ1) are more easily fulfilled as OSE tends to be large. Further, if the
adverse eﬀect of an additional competitor on one’s own profit is higher, the
acquisition condition is also more easily fulfilled as MSE is larger. Finally,
if small firms earn lower profits, conditions (ENT0) and (ENT1) are more
easily met. Also, as small firm profits are roughly equivalent to acquisition
costs, (ACQ0) and (ACQ1) are easier to fulfill if small firm profits are low.
Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If the parameters of the model change so that small firm profits
fall or OSE rises or MSE falls, the strong concentration equilibrium becomes
more likely (other things being equal).
It is tempting to speak of an increase in competition if the three conditions
in corollary 1 hold simultaneously for a parameter change: In a competitive
environment, one would clearly expect small firm profits to be low. Also,
there should be a particularly large payoﬀ to getting ahead of others (high
OSE) and to eliminating competitors (MSE).
Even though such a notion of competitiveness has some appeal, it is not
fully consistent with alternative measures of competition that are used in
specific examples.15 For instance, consider a model with Cournot competition
and linear demand x = a − p. Suppose marginal costs c (Yi) are decreasing
in Yi, so that there are cost synergies from acquisitions. Then firms are in
a standard heterogeneous Cournot model. In such a model, a reduction in
a is typically regarded as increasing competition. Indeed, it reduces profits
of small (ineﬃcient) firms. However, it also reduces large firm profits, which
15Boone (2000) provides a more comprehensive discussion of measures of competition.
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are
πL =
[a− Ic (Y1) + (I − 1) c (1)]2
(I + 1)2
.
As a result,
∂2πL
∂a∂Y1
= −2I
µ
1
2I + I2 + 1
¶
> 0.
Thus, negative eﬀects of increasing competition (decreasing a) on profits
translate into decreasing benefits from "getting ahead"
³
| ∂πL∂Y1 |
´
. In other
words, the OSE falls as a decreases.
Similar considerations hold in diﬀerentiated oligopoly with the elasticity
of substitution as a standard measure of competition.
As we shall see in the examples, however, even when the requirements of
"more intense competition" are not fulfilled simultaneously for some change
of parameters that is loosely associated with more intense competition, it is
often true that the strong concentration equilibrium becomes unambiguously
more likely as a result of the parameter shift.
4 Comparative Statics
We now carry out a simple comparative statics exercise. We compare the
equilibrium for initial values (Y 01 , F 0) and (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1), respectively. The
motivation for this exercise is obvious. Compared to (Y 01 , F 0), the constella-
tion (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1) corresponds to a situation after an acquisition, that is,
after concentration has increased. We ask under which conditions an acquisi-
tion makes a further acquisition more likely, that is, under which conditions
concentration is self-reinforcing. The following terminology is useful.16
Definition 1
(1) There are positive (negative) acquisition externalities at (Y 01 , F 0)
if ΠS (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1) > (<)ΠS (Y 01 , F 0) .
(2) There are increasing (decreasing) acquisition costs at (Y 01 , F 0) if
AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1) > (<)AC (Y 01 , F 0) .
16As usual subscripts stand for partial derivatives.
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(3) Product market competition satisfies strong demand-markup com-
plementarities (SDMC) if ΠLY1Y1 ≥ 0,ΠLY1F ≤ 0 and ΠLFF ≥ 0.
Acquisition externalities are thus positive if the benefits for a small firm
from the elimination of one small competitor outweigh the losses from facing
a larger competitor.17 As acquisition costs depend on small firm profits,
positive acquisition externalities and increasing acquisition costs are closely
related; generally, one would expect increasing acquisition costs whenever
acquisition externalities are positive.18
To understand strong demand-markup complementarities (3), represent
product market profits ΠL (Y1, F ) as the product of equilibrium demand
for the large firm, DL (Y1, F ), and the price-unit cost diﬀerence (mark-up),
ML (Y1, F ), so that
ΠL (Y1, F ) = DL (Y1, F ) ·ML (Y1, F ) .
Clearly, ΠLFF = 2DLF ·MLF + DLFF ·ML + DL ·MLFF . Under the natural as-
sumption that the presence of additional competitors reduces both equilib-
rium demand and mark-up (i.e., DLF < 0 and M
L
F < 0), the first term on the
right-hand side is positive, reflecting a complementarity between demand
and mark-up (a higher mark-up is more valuable for higher demand). The
remaining terms might be negative, but in many cases the complementarity
dominates, so that ΠLFF ≥ 0. In the following, we shall speak of demand-
markup complementarity (DMC) between two variables if changes in these
variables (e.g. reductions in firm numbers) both increase demand and mark-
up and therefore reinforce each other in their eﬀects. For strong mark-up
demand complementarity, DMC dominates over countereﬀects arising from
second derivatives of DL and ML. Demand-markup complementarities also
17The two competing eﬀects both result from (A3).
18Also, there is a close relation between positive acquisition externalities and the require-
ment ΠLFF ≥ 0 in the definition of strong demand-markup complementarities. Positive
acquisition externalities essentially say that the elimination of a small competitor is more
valuable than the reduction in size of a large competitor. This is a special case of the
requirement that the smaller a competitor is, the more valuable it is to make it even
smaller. Similarly, ΠLFF ≥ 0 says that the smaller the number of small competitors, the
more valuable it is to make this number even smaller.
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justify the assumption ΠLY1F ≤ 0; since an increase in own size Y1 and a reduc-
tion in the number of competitors F both have a positive eﬀect on demand
and mark-up, these eﬀects are self-reinforcing, which explains why ΠLY1F ≤ 0
might arise.19 ΠLY1Y1 ≥ 0 could be justified by similar demand-markup com-
plementarities. However, in Section 4, we provide plausible examples where
ΠLY1Y1 ≥ 0 does not hold because the demand-markup complementarity is
overwhelmed by concavity of DL and ML with respect to Y1.20
We now give a suﬃcient condition for self-reinforcing concentration.
Proposition 2 Suppose there are negative acquisition externalities, decreas-
ing acquisition costs and strong demand-markup complementarities. Then
concentration is self-reinforcing; that is, the set of parameters for which a
strong concentration equilibrium arises is greater for (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1) than
for (Y 01 , F 0).
Proof. Appendix 121
These conditions for self-reinforcing concentration are hard to satisfy si-
multaneously. Even so, the proposition is useful in identifying the forces
towards and against endogenous monopolization since demand-markup com-
plementarities are often a natural force towards self-reinforcing concentration.
Negative acquisition externalities and decreasing acquisition costs also work
in the same direction. However, arguably, they are less likely to hold; at
least if the competition eﬀect from eliminating a small firm is strong relative
to the "synergy eﬀect" that the large firm is a more powerful competitor,
acquisition externalities are likely to be positive.22 This suggests a natural
force against monopolization; as the number of remaining firms in the mar-
ket becomes small, acquisition externalities will often become positive as
the elimination of any one competitor has a strong positive eﬀect on the
profits of the remaining firms. Thus, increasing acquisition costs stop the
19ΠLY1F = D
L
Y1 ·MLF +DLF ·MLY1 +DLY1F ·ML+DL ·MLY1F . (DMC) implies that the first
two terms on the r.h.s. are non-positive. Therefore, as long as
¯¯
DLY1F
¯¯
and
¯¯
MLY1F
¯¯
are
suﬃciently small, ΠLY1F ≤ 0.
20ΠLY1Y1 = 2D
L
Y1 ·MLY1 +DL ·MLY1Y1 +DLY1Y1 ·ML. Thus (DMC) implies that the first
term on the r.h.s. is non-negative, but not necessarily the remaining terms.
21Appendices are available on the JEBO website.
22See Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Salant et al. (1983).
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tendency towards monopolization. As we shall see in specific examples, this
may indeed happen. However, we shall also provide an example where there
is a strong tendency towards monopolization in spite of positive acquisition
externalities.
5 Examples
We now study the interplay of forces towards increasing concentration and
countervailing forces in two examples. First, we consider cost-reducing acqui-
sitions in a linear Cournot example. Second, we analyze ”mergers for variety”
where the acquisition increases the product spectrum of a firm. In the for-
mer case, the resulting equilibrium and the myopic dynamics will turn out
to depend substantially on the initial situation. In the latter case, however,
the tendency towards increasing concentration will be very strong.
In line with the general notion that acquisition costs reflect opportunity
costs of the takeover targets, we assume that acquisition costs amount to
AC
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
= min
©
ΠS
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
,ΠS
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢ª
. (1)
In Appendix 2, we provide a detailed game-theoretical justification for this
specification.23
5.1 The Synergy Game
Our first example mainly serves to show that the initial industry constellation
influences whether concentration is self-reinforcing. If the initial firm number
is small, a concentration equilibrium exists, reflecting demand-markup com-
plementarities. If the initial firm number is large enough, increasing acqui-
sition costs and declining synergies can eventually destroy the concentration
equilibrium.
To see this, we specify the set-up of section 2 as follows. Firms compete
in a homogenous-good industry. Inverse demand is given by p = α − βX,
where p is the price, X is the total quantity sold in the industry and α and β
23Appendices are available on the JEBO website.
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are demand parameters. Firm i has the cost function Ci = xi/Y
γ
i , where xi is
the quantity produced by firm i and γ > 0 is a synergy parameter. Thus, the
large incumbent has lower marginal costs than the small incumbents, whose
marginal costs are normalized to 1. These synergies are, however, decreasing
in the number of firms already acquired.
For α = 5, β = γ = 1 and E = 0.75, Figure 1 describes the combina-
tions of Y 01 and F 0 for which each type of equilibrium emerges in the static
game.24 The lines in the figure correspond to the boundaries of the (no-)entry
conditions ENT1 and the acquisition conditions ACQ0 from Proposition 1.
< Figure 1 about here >
In this example, three pure strategy equilibria arise: the strong concentra-
tion equilibrium (1, 0), the weak concentration equilibrium (1, 1) where both
players invest, and the stationary equilibrium (0, 0) where no player invests.25
To understand how the equilibrium depends on initial values, consider the
eﬀects of these values on the profitability of entry and acquisitions, respec-
tively. First, note that entry becomes harder when there are many firms in
the market and/or when the large incumbent has a high state, that is, low
marginal costs, which explains the declining line ENT1. This is a reflection
of (A3), which is very natural in the context of this example: A high-state
firm has lower costs, which induces more aggressive behavior and therefore a
higher output. Such a higher output involves a negative externality for the
other firms in the market.
More interestingly, the acquisition condition is non-monotone in the ini-
tial number of small firms F 0. To understand this, recall that an acquisition
of a small incumbent is more profitable the higher OSE and MSE and the
lower AC. In general, changes in the number of small firms do not satisfy
these three conditions simultaneously. Concerning OSE, the eﬀect of any
given cost reduction on profits usually is higher the lower the number of
other firms in the market;26 with a lower number of competitors, the own
24The result uses proposition 1 for the equilibrium (1, 0) and similar conditions for the
other equilibria.
25For other parameterizations, additional constellations might arise, including multiple
equilibria.
26The size of the reduction itself is independent of the firm number.
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output level will be higher, making cost-reductions more valuable. This re-
flects demand-markup complementarities. Thus, OSE should become larger
as the number of competitors is smaller. The same is true for MSE; in-
tuitively, positive mark-up eﬀects from eliminating competition are higher
when the firm already has a high market share. On the other hand, acquisi-
tion costs increase as the number of small firms fall (because of higher small
firm profits). To sum up, OSE, MSE and AC should all increase as the
number of firms falls. The non-monotonicity in our example may thus be
explained as follows. Starting from high firm numbers, when these numbers
are reduced, increasing acquisition costs first dominate over the increase in
OSE and MSE, and acquisitions become less attractive. As F 0 decreases
further, the eﬀect of increasing OSE andMSE eventually dominates so that
acquisitions become more likely.
In Figure 1, an increase in Y 01 unambiguously makes the acquisition condi-
tion harder to satisfy. This reflects decreasing synergies, which reduce OSE.
However, there are also countervailing eﬀects of increasing Y 01 . First, any
given cost reduction is more valuable the higher the market share (again re-
flecting demand-markup complementarities). Second, decreasing acquisition
costs also have to be taken into account. Therefore, for alternative specifica-
tions (for instance, non-decreasing synergies), the impact of Y 01 on acquisition
incentives may be reversed.
Though our analysis is static, Figure 1 suggests a potentially important
implication for market dynamics. If the static game is played repeatedly,
the long-term behavior depends on the initial value of the large firm’s size
and the initial number of firms in the market. When there are few small
firms initially (as in point A), monopolization will eventually arise since the
system moves one unit down and one unit to the right whenever there is a
strong concentration equilibrium. Thus, even though synergies are declining
and acquisition costs are rising, firm asymmetries become increasingly pro-
nounced. When there are many small firms initially, however (as in point B),
the concentration process may come to a halt long before monopolization,
as the system reaches the stationary equilibrium. This result has interesting
implications. It would for instance suggest that a newly privatized industry
with a large incumbent and a small fringe may never develop towards a com-
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petitive market, whereas an otherwise identical industry may have a chance
to retain a relatively competitive market structure when it starts out with
less asymmetry.27
The eﬀects of changes in other parameters are briefly summarized without
figures. Consider the market size parameter α and the synergy parameter
γ. Entry becomes less likely as α decreases and γ increases. Acquisition
conditions are also easier to fulfill as γ increases. Less obviously, a decrease in
αmakes acquisitions more likely. This mainly reflects the eﬀects of decreasing
acquisition costs.
5.2 Merging for Variety
We now provide an example where the tendency towards monopolization
is much stronger. In spite of increasing acquisition costs, demand-markup
externalities are so overwhelming that all equilibria involve acquisitions. To
this end, we consider the case that firms use mergers and acquisitions to
expand into related markets.28 Accordingly, we now interpret a firm’s state
variable as the number of product varieties it sells. ΠL (Y 11 , F 1) is the profit of
a large firm that sells Y 11 varieties when there are F 1 small firms in the market,
each selling one variety. ΠS (Y 11 , F 1) is the profit of a small firm facing a large
firm that sells Y 11 varieties and F 1 − 1 other small firms. We introduce the
additional notation πL (Y 11 , V 1) = ΠL (Y 11 , V 1 − Y 11 ) /Y 11 for the profit of a
large firm per variety sold when its state is Y 11 and the total number of
varieties is V 1 = Y 11 +F 1. We thus write πS (Y 11 , V 1) = ΠS (Y 11 , V 1 − Y 11 ) for
the profits of a small firm when the total number of varieties is V 1 and the
large competitor sells Y 11 varieties.29
Suppose inverse demand is pl = a − bxl − c
P
k 6=l xk with a, b, c > 0 and
27However, the result of increasing dominance when starting at point A may be an
artifact of the simplifying assumption that only one firm is able to carry out acquisition.
Otherwise, countervailing eﬀects may arise. The reason is that, with declining synergies,
smaller firms should also have higher acquisiton incentives than large firms, leading to a
tendency towards declining asymmetries between firms.
28The model is related to Davidson and Deneckere. However, these authors consider
only incentives to merge and not incentives to enter.
29Implicit in this set-up is the symmetry assumption that each small firm earns the same
profit and that the large firm earns the same profit for each variety.
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b > c. Firms compete in prices.30 We set a = 5, b = 1,c = 0.75 and E = 0.15.
Figure 2 summarizes the equilibria. Note that the figure is only meaningful
for Y 01 ≤ V 0, the region above the bold line.
< Figure 2 about here >
There are some important diﬀerences with respect to the synergy exam-
ple. First, market entry becomes more likely as the large incumbent sells
more varieties. This reflects positive acquisition externalities as large firms
price less aggressively to avoid cannibalizing demand on its other varieties.31
Second, for a similar reason, as the number of varieties Y 0 sold by the large
firm increases, further acquisitions become more attractive in spite of increas-
ing acquisition costs. Intuitively, the more varieties the large firm already
sells, the larger the beneficial eﬀect of controlling the prices and thus the
mark-up for an additional variable. Again, this is an instance of demand-
markup complementarities.
The resulting equilibrium behavior is much simpler than in the synergy
example since only the strong and the weak concentration equilibria ((1, 0)
and (1, 1)) are possible.32 The strong concentration equilibrium is more likely
when the total number of varieties V 0 is large and the large firm sells a small
number of these varieties, because entry becomes less attractive. More inter-
estingly, acquisitions are worthwhile for arbitrary initial conditions. Thus,
the positive eﬀects from acquisitions are always greater than the acquisition
costs (i.e., small firm profits). Intuitively, the benefits from an acquisition
30For price competition, it would seem more natural to consider demand functions xl =
A− Bpl + C
P
k 6=l
pk rather than inverse demand. However, this would, for instance, imply
that the maximal demand per variety is independent of the number of varieties. Our
demand system corresponds to a demand function xl = A (V ) − B (V ) + C (V )
P
k=l pk
with A0 < 0, B0 > 0, C 0 < 0, which seems more plausible.
31Even so, (A3) still holds: If a large firm introduces a new variety without acquiring
a small firm, the negative eﬀect of the competitors coming from the increasing number of
varieties dominates over the positive eﬀect of softer behavior.
32This result might appear to contradict Sutton’s (1998) general result that markets
with a certain degree of horizontal product diﬀerentiation reveal low concentration levels.
However, in his model the firm number is fixed. Further, firms are not involved in acqui-
sition and market entry decisions, respectively, but in the choice of quality levels for each
of their varieties.
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consist of the profits from selling one more variety and the increased prof-
its on the other varieties that comes from the control over the prices of an
additional variety. The second eﬀect introduces a wedge between small firm
profits, that is, acquisition costs, and acquisition benefits, which is why ac-
quisitions are so attractive in this context.
We briefly report the eﬀects of two other parameters. An increase in
market size a makes entry more likely. Also, it turns out that market size
increases leave the acquisition condition unaﬀected so that the strong con-
centration equilibrium becomes less likely.33 An increase in substitutability
c decreases entry incentives and increases acquisition incentives so that the
strong concentration equilibrium becomes more likely. Both observations are
consistent with the intuitive notion that increasing intensity of competition
increases the chances for a strong concentration equilibrium.
5.3 An Application: The Beer Industry in the UK
In the mid 1980’s, the United KingdomMonopolies and Mergers Commission
(MMC) investigated the beer industry.34 At this time, the industry concen-
tration was substantial: six national brewers had a market share of about
75 %. This state was the outcome of a process that had been going on for
about a century. Acquisitions of small firms by large brewers played an im-
portant role, whereas entry was negligible. Therefore, the industry evolution
corresponds roughly to a sequence of strong concentration equilibria.
Two features of the UK beer market have been crucial for the emergence
of the concentrated market structure. First, according to Slade, "on-premise"
sales, i.e., sales in public houses or similar outlets account for an unusually
high proportion of total sales (around 85%). Second, the extent of vertical
integration has been very high throughout the century, and as early as 1913,
the proportion of "tied houses" was 95 % ; similarly for 1950 (Sutton 1991).35
As a crude approximation, one can therefore think of the beer industry as
consisting of vertically integrated firms who sell beer to customers in pubs.
33This is a result of the linear specification.
34This section relies heavily on Sutton (1991) and Slade (1998).
35"Tied Houses" are pubs that are owned by a brewery or at least are provided with
cheap capital (Slade).
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Each pub corresponds to a diﬀerent product variety. This would suggest that
the industry matches our "merger for variety" model. Indeed, according to
Sutton (1991, 516), "the main scope for expansion ... lies in acquiring rival
brewers and so obtaining access to their retail outlets."
Thus, in our language, firms acquire others to control product varieties.
The industry evolution is therefore consistent with our "merger for variety"
model that gives rise to strong concentration equilibria when entry costs are
suﬃciently high. This condition indeed holds; because of severe licensing
restrictions, the possibility of entry has been limited.
Note, however, that access to retail outlets is not the only motivation
for acquisitions in the beer industry. Sutton (1991) suggests that, in spite
of the high level of concentration before the MMC investigation, plant size
was still slightly below the minimum eﬃcient scale. Earlier acquisitions may
therefore also be interpreted as attempts to achieve cost-reducing synergies.
Of course, if these synergies were suﬃciently strong, this provides another
reason why the OSE might have been high enough for a strong concentration
equilibrium to emerge.
6 Conclusions and Extensions
Our analysis has dealt with two separate, but closely related issues. Proposi-
tion 1 identified forces towards concentration in static situations; Proposition
2 identified under which circumstances concentration is self-reinforcing. We
now sum up and interpret our main findings, and we discuss some extensions.
First, consider the circumstances under which a strong concentration
equilibrium arises in any one period. These circumstances concern the na-
ture of product market competition, the "technological" assumptions on the
acquisition (e.g., extent of synergies, eﬀect on product spectrum of firm) and
the initial market structure. Typically, small market size or a low degree
of product market diﬀerentiation or high synergies result in concentration
equilibria.
As we saw in the examples, the number of firms has a more ambiguous
eﬀect on the likelihood of concentration equilibria, even though a larger num-
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ber of firms would usually be loosely associated with intense competition.36
On the one hand, both acquisition costs and entry profits are negatively re-
lated to the total number of firms. On the other hand, the firm number also
tends to have a negative eﬀect on OSE and MSE because demand-markup
complementarities are lower as the firm number increases. This is why Propo-
sition 1 does not imply a monotone relation between the firm number and
the likelihood of a strong concentration equilibrium in general.
Proposition 2 and the examples in Section 5 give us some idea as to when
the simultaneous reduction in firm numbers and the increase in large firm size
brought about by an acquisition make further acquisitions more likely, that
is, when concentration is self-reinforcing. Demand-markup complementari-
ties are the main force in this direction, if acquisitions have a positive eﬀect
on equilibrium demand and mark-up, these eﬀects are often self-reinforcing.
Such an eﬀect is present in the synergy model as increasing the mark-up
through the synergies from an acquisition is more valuable when the demand
is high due to cost reductions from earlier acquisitions. Similarly, in the
variety model, increasing the mark-up through obtaining control on a fur-
ther variety is more valuable when demand is high because the firm already
controls a large number of varieties.
Negative acquisition externalities provide another reason why concentra-
tion can be self-reinforcing. For instance, such negative externalities will arise
in the synergy model for suﬃciently large values of the synergy parameter.
Negative externalities support self-reinforcing concentration for two reasons.
First, decreasing small firm profits make entry less attractive. Second, they
imply decreasing acquisition costs, making acquisitions more attractive.
Countervailing forces arise, in particular, from positive acquisition exter-
nalities, which are familiar from several oligopoly models. Intuitively, they
arise when non-involved firms benefit from mergers because of the reduc-
tion in competition. Reversing the argument for negative externalities, posi-
36This relation between the number of firms and the intensity of competition is a ceteris
paribus statement for exogenous firm numbers, corresponding to the exercise we performed
in Section 5.1. When firm numbers are endogenous, a change in external conditions
that is generally interpreted as "more intense competition" (e.g., a shift from Cournot to
Bertrand) can lead to a reduction in firm numbers ( Sutton 1991, ch.2).
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tive externalities work against self-reinforcing concentration for two reasons.
First, positive acquisition externalities imply that acquisitions increase small
firm profits. Therefore, they make future acquisitions more costly, which
works against monopolization. Second, the increasing small firm profits as-
sociated with positive acquisition externalities make entry more likely, which
means that after suﬃciently many acquisitions the concentration equilibrium
may well break down.
Another countervailing force arises when there are decreasing synergies.
Then, in spite of demand-markup complementarities, condition (SMDC)
need not hold.37
The above statements are clearly of a ceteris paribus type, as the "merger
for variety" example shows. In spite of increasing acquisition costs, concen-
tration is self-reinforcing because demand-markup complementarities exist.
Various extensions of our approach are conceivable. In the working paper
(Aydemir and Schmutzler 2002), we present some additional forces that arise
in the context of forward-looking firms. We also show that the main insights
survive when there are many large incumbents and potential entrants.38 Fi-
nally, it is simple to extend the analysis of Section 3 to the case that the
large incumbent has three alternatives: do not invest, acquire a small firm,
or carry out an internal investment (at fixed cost K) that increases the size
as much as the acquisition. In this case, for the strong concentration equi-
librium with acquisitions rather than internal investment to exist, we require
the additional condition that
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0
¢
> AC
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−K. (2)
An acquisition is more attractive because it has an MSE as well as an
OSE; it might fail to be an equilibrium strategy only if acquisitions are
more costly than internal investments. If (2) does not hold, an equilibrium
with internal investment and no entry exists when (ENT1) holds. The cor-
37Technically, ΠLY1Y1 ≤ 0 may not hold if D
L
Y1Y1 ≤ 0 and/or M
L
Y1Y1 ≤ 0 and large in
absolute terms.
38However, the analysis requires more sophisticated tools (developed in Athey and
Schmutzler).
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responding no-entry condition always holds. Intuitively, entry is less likely
when a large firm invests internally rather than externally because the po-
tential entrant does not benefit from the elimination of a competitor in the
former case.
7 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We have to show that
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
−AC
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
≥ (3)
ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 − 1, F 0 + 1
¢
−AC
¡
Y 01 − 1, F 0 + 1
¢
and
ΠS
¡
Y 0, F 0
¢
≤ ΠS
¡
Y 0 + 1, F 0 − 1
¢
. (4)
By negative acquisition externalities and decreasing acquisition costs, it suf-
fices to show that
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
≥ ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 − 1, F 0 + 1
¢
.
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Using ΠLY1Y1 ≥ 0,ΠLY1F ≤ 0,ΠLFF ≥ 0,
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
=
ΠL
¡
Y 01 + 1, F
0 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0 − 1
¢
+ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0 − 1
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
=Z Y 01 +1
Y 01
ΠLY1
¡
Y1, F 0 − 1
¢
dY1 −
Z F 0
F 0−1
ΠLF
¡
Y 01 , F
¢
dF ≥Z Y 01 +1
Y 01
ΠLY1
¡
Y 01 − 1, F 0 − 1
¢
dY1 −
Z F 0
F 0−1
ΠLF
¡
Y 01 , F
¢
dF =Z Y 01
Y 01 −1
ΠLY1
¡
Y1, F 0 − 1
¢
dY1 −
Z F 0
F 0−1
ΠLF
¡
Y 01 , F
¢
dF ≥Z Y 01
Y 01 −1
ΠLY1
¡
Y1, F 0
¢
dY1 −
Z F 0+1
F 0
ΠLF
¡
Y 01 − 1, F
¢
dF =
ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 − 1, F 0
¢
+ΠL
¡
Y 01 − 1, F 0
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 − 1, F 0 + 1
¢
=
ΠL
¡
Y 01 , F
0
¢
−ΠL
¡
Y 01 − 1, F 0 + 1
¢
.
8 Appendix 2: Acquisition Prices
We now justify formula (1) for the takeover price, taking the entry decision as
given and using the following acquisition game that elaborates the notion that
takeover prices depend on the stand-alone profits of small firms. Suppose, in a
first stage, the large incumbent states a maximum price at which he is willing
to take over the small firm, the reservation price r. In the second stage, all
small incumbents i simultaneously name a price si at which they are willing
to be taken over. If smin ≡ min
i
{si} ≤ r and N ≥ 1 firms choose smin, one of
these firms is acquired with probability 1/N ; acquisition costs are then smin.
A firm that is not taken over earns product market payoﬀs corresponding
to the market structure after the acquisition and entry decisions have been
made, that is, ΠSNT ≡ ΠS (Y 01 , F 0 + aE) if there is no takeover and aE ∈ {0, 1}
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is the entrant’s decision, and ΠST ≡ ΠS (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1 + aE) if some other
firm is taken over. The profits for the large firm are defined analogously as
ΠLNT and ΠLT . We first analyze the Nash equilibria of the second stage game
for given values of r. The following Lemma summarizes the small firms’
equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium payoﬀs of all firms.
Lemma 1 (a) Suppose ΠSNT > r. Then there is a pure strategy equilibrium
without acquisition in which each small firm sets s∗i = ΠSNT . The large
firm thus obtains net profits of ΠLNT ; each small firm obtains ΠSNT .
(a1) If in addition r < ΠST , there is no pure strategy equilibrium where
takeover takes place.
(a2) If r ≥ ΠST , there exists exactly one additional equilibrium, where
each firm plays s∗∗i = ΠST . For the small firms this equilibrium
is Pareto-dominated by any equilibrium without acquisition. Also,
s∗∗i is weakly dominated by s∗i .
(b) Suppose ΠSNT < r ≤ ΠST .
(b1) If r < ΠST , then in any pure strategy equilibrium, one firm sets
s∗i = r and is taken over, while all other firms set more than r and
earn ΠST .
(b2) If r = ΠST , all firms set s∗i = r, and one firm is taken over. All
small firms earn ΠST .
In any case, the large firm earns net profits of ΠLT − r.
(c) If r ≥ max
©
ΠSNT ,ΠST
ª
, there is a pure strategy equilibrium where acqui-
sition takes place and each firm sets s∗i = ΠST . Any other pure strategy
equilibrium must have smin = ΠST .
Proof. (a) As the small firms demand more for an acquisition than the
large firm is willing to pay, there is no takeover if each firm demands ΠSNT .
Also, the proposed strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium. To see this,
first note that any deviation where si > r would not change equilibrium
profits, as no takeover would occur. Deviations to si ≤ r would lead to an
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acquisition of the deviating firm. Its profits would fall to si ≤ r < ΠSNT .
(a1) First, suppose there is a pure strategy equilibrium where one firm sets
si ≤ r and si < sj for all j 6= i. Then firm i is taken over at a price si that
is smaller than ΠSNT , the profit it would obtain by avoiding takeover with a
suﬃciently high si. Next, suppose there are N > 1 firms setting minimal
smin ≤ r. Then each of these firms obtains expected profits 1N smin+
N−1
N ·ΠST .
If it chooses si > r some other firm is taken over and profits increase to ΠST .
(a2) If every firm plays s∗∗i = ΠST , each one of them is taken over with
positive probability, but it obtains profits ΠST whether it is taken over or
not. Reducing si would mean that the firm is taken over with probability 1.
Increasing si would mean the firm is definitely not taken over but profits are
still ΠST . Pareto-dominance follows immediately from ΠSNT > r ≥ ΠST . The
strategy s∗∗i is weakly dominated by s0i = ΠSNT . s∗∗i gives profits of ΠST with
certainty. Deviation to s0i = ΠSNT > r will give profits of ΠSNT if there is no
takeover and ΠST if there is.
(b1) The proposed strategy combination is an equilibrium. If firm i sets
si = r, it can obviously not increase its profits by reducing si (i.e., selling
itself at a lower price). Increasing si would mean there is no takeover and
profits would fall to ΠSNT . The other firms could only change their payoﬀs by
setting sj ≤ r. Then they would be taken over with some positive probability,
leading to expected payoﬀs of less than ΠST .
Next, there can be no other pure strategy equilibria. First, there can be no
pure strategy equilibria with more than one firm charging r or less. Deviation
to si > r would lead to a profit of ΠST ,which is more than what they would
obtain with a positive probability of being taken over. Second, there can be
no equilibrium where exactly one firm sets si < r, as it could increase its
payoﬀ by increasing si to r.
Finally, there can be no equilibrium with smin > r. Then firms would obtain
ΠSNT , and firms would have an incentive to underbid each other, so as to earn
the takeover premium r.
(b2) In this subcase, the proof for the proposed equilibrium strategy is the
same as for subcase (a2).
(c) First, this is an equilibrium. As an acquisition takes place if everybody
charges si = ΠST , firms that are taken over and those that are not earn the
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same profit, which cannot be improved upon by deviation. Next, there can
be no equilibrium with smin 6= ΠST . If smin > r, each firm wants to deviate
to r to be taken over with certainty. If r ≥ smin > ΠST , each firm wants to
deviate slightly below smin to be taken over with certainty. If smin < ΠST , the
firms oﬀering smin could avoid being taken over at the low price by increasing
their bid to ΠST , which would then be their payoﬀ.
The intuition is as follows. In case (a), the takeover price is smaller than
what small firms obtain in the market when there is no takeover. Thus,
there is no incentive to deviate to si ≤ r. In case (b), there are positive
acquisition externalities so that small firms prefer a situation where one of
their small competitors is taken over to a situation without takeover. On the
other hand, when r < ΠST , they prefer some other firm to be taken over; the
”chicken” outcome is thus natural. Finally, with the high reservation price
in (c), each firm wants to be taken over: standing alone, it would earn ΠST or
ΠSNT , depending on whether some other firm is taken over or not, that is, in
any case, less than the reservation price.
The consequences of lemma 1 are as follows. In case (a), it is relatively
safe to argue that, even though it exists, the equilibrium where a firm is taken
over is implausible, as it is both Pareto-ineﬃcient and in weakly dominated
strategies. Thus, the most plausible prediction is that there is no takeover.
In case (b), the various equilibria are equivalent from the point of view of
the acquiring firm, as the takeover prices are identical and the firm does
not care which competitor it acquires. Thus, if one believes that one of
the pure strategy Nash equilibria is chosen, the relevant prediction is that
there is takeover at price r. One might argue, however, that mixed strategy
equilibria are more plausible in this case. Such equilibria would have small
firms randomizing between r and ΠST , leaving the possibility that there is
no takeover. In case (c), the only pure strategy equilibrium is in weakly
dominated strategies. However, this equilibrium can be approximated by a
sequence of equilibria of discrete games that are not weakly dominated. Thus,
in spite of some reservations, we take this weakly dominated equilibrium as
the prediction.39
39This equilibrium is as good or as bad as an ordinary Bertrand equilibrium which is
also weakly dominated, but the discrete approximation of non-dominated equilibria (Mas-
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We now define the takeover price to be the lowest level of r for which a
takeover will occur in the selected Nash equilibrium of the acquisition cost
game. First, suppose ΠSNT < ΠST . Then, for any r that is slightly above
ΠSNT , takeover takes place by part (b) of lemma 1. Thus ΠSNT is a natural
approximation of the takeover price. On the other hand, if ΠST ≤ ΠSNT , the
takeover price is ΠST by part (c) of lemma 1. Summing up, we obtain the
following result, stated as a corollary.
Corollary 2 Acquisition costs, as determined by the equilibrium of the ac-
quisition game, amount to AC
¡
Y t−11 − 1, F t−1 − 1
¢
= min
©
ΠST ,ΠSNT
ª
.
Colell et al. 1995).
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Entrant −→
↓ Incumbent a2 = 0 a2 = 1
a1 = 0 ΠL (Y 01 , F 0) , 0
ΠL (Y 01 , F 0 + 1) ,
ΠS (Y 01 , F 0 + 1)− E
a1 = 1
ΠL (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1)−
AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0 − 1) , 0
ΠL (Y 01 + 1, F 0)−
AC (Y 01 + 1, F 0) ,
ΠS (Y 01 + 1, F 0)− E
Table 1: The Payoﬀ-Matrix for the One-Shot Game
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B
Figure 1: Pure Strategy Equilibria in the Static Synergy Game
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Figure 2: Pure Strategy Equilibria in the Merger for Variety Game
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